Thank you for your post. You very elegantly laid out an scenario that had been swirling in my head, and I think this particular scenario became more likely after reading your post.
Your post also strengthen my desire to pivot from finance to policy. I need to figure out how to do this. I find it paramount that more people (both in power and the general populace) understand the possibilities of massive economic disruption.
Just spent an hour or so going through this and some of the hyperlinks I hadn't previously encountered in detail. It was truly worth a read. Really stimulating to read something that uses interdisciplinary thinking to critically analyze potential futures in the field of AI. Great work and congratulations on getting this out!
Couple questions:
1) Isn't the purpose of power accumulation by states and the elite teleologically founded in control of the populous? Isn't there then something to be said for the fact that at some point along the way to that 40% reduction in the workforce there will be a public response that will affect the automation process even if it is heavily incentivized for those in power? Maybe you agree and it is one possible "pushback" factor.
2) This might be stupid, but where does democracy factor into all this? I was expecting this article to somewhere address how a reduction in the incentive to invest in people would ultimately affect the normative state of national governance from the perspective of the "small ruling elite." Seems like a easy jump to make from the arguments you make. Obviously the dangers to democracy stemming from AI have been widely discussed, but this seems like an argument different in nature than the usual one about mis/disinformation and power-centralization (at least partially). It almost seems like you would argue that the reason democracy works is because it is beneficial to the economic elite of democracies to live in one. If it stops being so, since the freedom and prosperity of citizens is no longer imperative for the amplification of revenue, then the incentive for democracy itself falls through, no?
I may be jumping the gun if you plan on addressing this in your next post, but food for thought nonetheless.
Glad to hear you enjoyed it! Most of this is coming in a future post, mostly because my thinking isn’t finished yet. Still, seems worth giving it a shot. On your questions:
1) Basically yes. I’ll cover this in a future post, but one way to escape the rentier curse is to credibly threaten elite power. The paper I use as a lit review for rentier states is actually a theory paper on why some of them dole out welfare. They center their analysis on Oman, arguing that the autocracy had a credible left wing threat and chose to buy the public with financial incentives. I think the autocracy -> welfare state pipeline will close with AGI because the state should rapidly expand their infrastructural power, preventing most uprisings. Sam Hammond’s AI and the Leviathan informs my thinking here.
2) I’ll argue that democratic incentives could override concentrated capital ones in the solutions post. Norway pulled this off, but mostly because they already had strong democratic institutions with low corruption and a competent bureaucracy. Many of our democracies look nothing like that, and that’s a problem we should address now. That being said, I considered it through the lens you expected me to! I’ll think about this for a while.
My gut take is that the actions of actors during institutional formation matter, and that sometimes exceptional people defy incentives. I don’t discount great man views of history. George Washington comes to mind as someone who defied incentives despite the odds. The future will be bright if more people like him are steering it.
But yes, democracy is also empowered by incentives. If they shift away from regular people, autocracy seems more likely to emerge.
It seems that potential 'solutions' are either luddism, or a significant reshaping of society to decouple capital from ability to survive/thrive (abandoning capitalism as we know it, perhaps beginning with some form of UBI).
I'm curious about this suggestion:
>Tech that increases human agency, fosters human ownership of AI systems or clusters of agents, or otherwise allows humans to remain economically relevant could incentivize powerful actors to continue investing in human capita
What could this possibly look like in a world where AI reasoning is generally superior to even expert humans in essentially every regard? What could be the incentive to prefer a human actor if in practical terms an artificial one performs better? The question is 'why not let an AI do this instead?' no matter how 'high up' you get, even in positions of leadership, or for training the AI, or orchestrating or directing its actions.
Thank you for your post. You very elegantly laid out an scenario that had been swirling in my head, and I think this particular scenario became more likely after reading your post.
Your post also strengthen my desire to pivot from finance to policy. I need to figure out how to do this. I find it paramount that more people (both in power and the general populace) understand the possibilities of massive economic disruption.
I look forward to the follow ups of thos post.
Just spent an hour or so going through this and some of the hyperlinks I hadn't previously encountered in detail. It was truly worth a read. Really stimulating to read something that uses interdisciplinary thinking to critically analyze potential futures in the field of AI. Great work and congratulations on getting this out!
Couple questions:
1) Isn't the purpose of power accumulation by states and the elite teleologically founded in control of the populous? Isn't there then something to be said for the fact that at some point along the way to that 40% reduction in the workforce there will be a public response that will affect the automation process even if it is heavily incentivized for those in power? Maybe you agree and it is one possible "pushback" factor.
2) This might be stupid, but where does democracy factor into all this? I was expecting this article to somewhere address how a reduction in the incentive to invest in people would ultimately affect the normative state of national governance from the perspective of the "small ruling elite." Seems like a easy jump to make from the arguments you make. Obviously the dangers to democracy stemming from AI have been widely discussed, but this seems like an argument different in nature than the usual one about mis/disinformation and power-centralization (at least partially). It almost seems like you would argue that the reason democracy works is because it is beneficial to the economic elite of democracies to live in one. If it stops being so, since the freedom and prosperity of citizens is no longer imperative for the amplification of revenue, then the incentive for democracy itself falls through, no?
I may be jumping the gun if you plan on addressing this in your next post, but food for thought nonetheless.
Glad to hear you enjoyed it! Most of this is coming in a future post, mostly because my thinking isn’t finished yet. Still, seems worth giving it a shot. On your questions:
1) Basically yes. I’ll cover this in a future post, but one way to escape the rentier curse is to credibly threaten elite power. The paper I use as a lit review for rentier states is actually a theory paper on why some of them dole out welfare. They center their analysis on Oman, arguing that the autocracy had a credible left wing threat and chose to buy the public with financial incentives. I think the autocracy -> welfare state pipeline will close with AGI because the state should rapidly expand their infrastructural power, preventing most uprisings. Sam Hammond’s AI and the Leviathan informs my thinking here.
2) I’ll argue that democratic incentives could override concentrated capital ones in the solutions post. Norway pulled this off, but mostly because they already had strong democratic institutions with low corruption and a competent bureaucracy. Many of our democracies look nothing like that, and that’s a problem we should address now. That being said, I considered it through the lens you expected me to! I’ll think about this for a while.
My gut take is that the actions of actors during institutional formation matter, and that sometimes exceptional people defy incentives. I don’t discount great man views of history. George Washington comes to mind as someone who defied incentives despite the odds. The future will be bright if more people like him are steering it.
But yes, democracy is also empowered by incentives. If they shift away from regular people, autocracy seems more likely to emerge.
Excellent and clean writing, I will keep following!
It seems that potential 'solutions' are either luddism, or a significant reshaping of society to decouple capital from ability to survive/thrive (abandoning capitalism as we know it, perhaps beginning with some form of UBI).
I'm curious about this suggestion:
>Tech that increases human agency, fosters human ownership of AI systems or clusters of agents, or otherwise allows humans to remain economically relevant could incentivize powerful actors to continue investing in human capita
What could this possibly look like in a world where AI reasoning is generally superior to even expert humans in essentially every regard? What could be the incentive to prefer a human actor if in practical terms an artificial one performs better? The question is 'why not let an AI do this instead?' no matter how 'high up' you get, even in positions of leadership, or for training the AI, or orchestrating or directing its actions.